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Cultural Contestation in China: Ethnicity, Identity and the State 
Christina Maags 
Introduction 
During the past two decades, the protection of traditional cultural practices has taken center 
stage in international cultural governance. With the adoption of the UNESCO Convention for 
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH Convention) in 2003, 171 state parties 
have committed to implementing domestic “intangible cultural heritage” (ICH) safeguarding 
measures. ICH refers to “practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well 
as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural 
heritage” (UNESCO 2003). Among the earliest signatories is the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), which has eagerly implemented various UNESCO “best practices” of ICH 
safeguarding. This is surprising as the PRC previously banned many forms of traditional 
culture - most notably during the Cultural Revolution. Among the UNESCO’s best practices, 
the PRC adopted a national inventory of ICH practices, creating ICH lists on multiple 
government levels, as well as its own variation of the Living Human Treasures System 
(UNESCO 2002), the ICH Inheritor program (chuanchengren xiangmu) (SC 2005; MOC 
2006). 
Although the PRC’s official embrace of traditional culture has unleashed an “ICH fever” 
among the Chinese populace, enhancing awareness and promotion (Maags 2018 
forthcoming), the party-state’s ICH safeguarding programs have not only had positive effects. 
Indeed, the listing of ICH practices on domestic and UNESCO ICH representative lists as 
well as the ICH inheritor program has created exclusion and inclusion effects which have 
fueled cultural contestation among local communities (Svensson 2006; Maags 2018 
forthcoming). Although heritage lists’ exclusion and inclusion effects have been well-
documented (Hafstein 2009: 104), few studies examine how administrative implementation 
mechanisms intentionally and unintentionally create these effects. This is surprising as 
academic literature identifies state policy and bureaucracy as a major cause for cultural 
contestation (e.g. Harrison 2010; Waterton 2010).  
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Cultural contestation arises between two distinct ethnic or cultural groups, or between the 
state and such groups. While much as been written about the interests and strategies behind 
engaging in contestation, Ross (2007) has emphasized that cultural contestation goes 
beyond these structural or interest-based approaches. In fact, what matters are the groups’ 
identities which are strongly connected to heritage, cultural practices and expressions be 
they tangible such as landscapes, monuments and artefacts or intangible as for instance 
rituals, festivals or language. To capture the role cultural identity plays in cultural contestation, 
Ross therefore agues for examining cultural expressions as markers of identity and to retrace 
changes in cultural narratives which may either be exclusive, thus enhancing the conflict, or 
inclusive, providing an opportunity to mitigate further conflicts (2007: 1-3). 
Following Ross’ call for a greater focus on cultural identity and expressions in political 
science research on cultural contestation, this chapter inquires into the ways government 
policy and administrative procedures foster cultural contestation between the state and 
ethnic groups. It seeks to add to the literature by shedding light on the multiple and often 
ambiguous effects government policy and administration may have on local ethnic culture 
due to its multi-level structure. It also seeks to show how these effects do not necessarily 
result in open contestation and conflict, but also take more indirect or subtle forms of 
resistance. Drawing on a case study of Lancang County in Yunnan province, PR China, this 
chapter will demonstrate the ways in which the different interests and strategies within 
Chinese multi-level governance may on the one hand promote ethnic cultural identities and 
vernacular practices, while simultaneously brushing over them to pursue economic and 
political interests on the other, thereby creating local cultural contestation.  
The chapter is structured as follows: After providing a review of the scholarly literature on this 
topic, I will briefly introduce the theoretical and methodological approach which inform this 
study. The main part of the chapter will demonstrate, firstly, how Chinese change in policy 
and administration have provided opportunities for Lancang County to foster its cultural 
identity and receive national recognition for its cultural practices. Subsequently, the chapter 
will outline how diverging interests within Chinese multi-level governance result in local, 
indirect forms of cultural contestation through the establishment of counternarratives. After a 
discussion on the ambiguous effects of the Chinese multi-level governance on local 
community culture, this chapter will end with some concluding remarks on the broader issues 
underlying ethnic identity and cultural contestations in “state-nations”1 of the Global South. 
                                                          
1 Stepan et al. (2010) have argued that state nations are “multicultural, and sometimes even have significant 
multinational components, which nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and loyalty from their 
citizens, an identification and loyalty that proponents of homogeneous nation states perceive that only nation 
states can engender” (2010: 4). In contrast to nation-states, state-nations, however, are “robustly multinational’’ 
societies as the states “have deep cultural diversity, some of which is territorially based and politically articulated 
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The State of the Art 
A study of the PRC nicely reflects broader issues around ethnicity, cultural identity and the 
state unfolding in many post-colonial or post-communist states. Like many other countries, 
the Chinese state has undergone many ruptures in its development, particularly in the 
cultural realm. As mentioned above, while the Chinese party-state had criticized traditional 
culture and religion as superstitious and feudal, resulting in a large-scale repression and 
destruction of it tangible and intangible heritage during the Cultural Revolution (Gao Yuan 
1987: 85-95), it has slowly changed its attitude since its Reform and Opening Period 
commenced in 1978 (Barmé 1999: 236; 256). This change in attitude has triggered 
heightened scholarly interest in the reasons and implications of this change in government 
policy. Blumenfield and Silverman (2013), for instance, have argued that the Chinese party-
state has renewed interest in its past as it may be used as a tool to promote nationalist 
sentiments among the populace, enhance economic development as well as legitimize 
minority politics (2013: 3-23). Many academic studies have examined the use of heritage as 
resource to develop the tourism industry (Shepherd and Yu 2012; Zhu and Li 2013), to 
enhance nationalism (Gladney 1996; Cheung 2012) and foster ethnic minority relations 
(Yang et al. 2008; Zhu 2016) whereas others have studied underlying governmental policies 
and procedures (Bodolec 2012; Liang 2013; Maags and Holbig 2016).  
Studying the impact on government policies on local communities, many scholars have 
demonstrated that government policies and procedures foster cultural contestation between 
the Chinese state and local communities (Schein 2000; Svensson 2006; Yu 2015). You 
(2015), for instance, has pointed to the conflicts that emerge between different state and 
local actors during the negation of which ICH practices are to be nominated for inclusion on 
ICH lists. She shows that conflicts not only arise due to cultural contestation between local 
communities concerning whose traditions are to be officially recognized. Conflicts also occur 
due to the lack of non-state actor involvement in decision-making as local governments 
control the inscription process, its management as well as the allocation of state funds. In a 
similar vein, Chen (2015) has examined local government’s interest in using ICH as a 
tourism resource and argues that the subjectivity and agency of local cultural practitioners 
are constrained and weakened through strong state control.  
As the People’s Republic is home to 56 ethnic minorities (Wang 2015: 4), state control and 
resulting cultural contestation are at times exacerbated in ethnic minority areas. Echoing 
Chau’s (2005) claim that the party-state seeks to de-politicise religion by reframing it as 
culture, Liang (2013) has examined how the local government in Dali Bai Autonomous 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
by significant groups that, in the name of nationalism and self-determination, advance claims of independence” 
(Stepan et al. 2010: 1-4). 
4 
 
Prefecture in Yunnan province has gone to great efforts to inscribe a local religious festival 
on the domestic ICH items list, particularly associating a supposed fertility cult and sexual 
promiscuity with the festival. 2  Yet the party-state’s control of ICH inscription and 
management is also resisted by local non-state stakeholders. In her analysis of Miao village 
ritual practices Yu (2015) has found that local communities create and disseminate counter-
narratives as well as secretly and publicly perform their rituals which go against official 
interpretations of the ICH practice. 
In PR China, cultural contestation between the state and ethnic groups are thus commonly 
related to the party-state’s desire to control and depoliticize ethnic minority culture and 
religion on the one hand, while making economic profit on the other. As the examples of 
cultural contestation and resistance have shown, in an authoritarian state such as China 
ethnic groups rarely openly contest state policies producing cultural contestations, and rather 
use alternative more subtle ways of resisting cultural “superscription” (cf. Duara 2010). 
Moreover, many studies are couched in a narrative of “the state” vs. “the ethnic minority” -  a 
narrative which can also be found in Ross’ (2007) work. What I want to highlight here is, 
however, that the state is a multi-layered and fragmented entity in which a plurality of actors 
pursues very different interests. Building on Ross’ notion of cultural contestation, I now turn 
to incorporating a multi-level governance perspective into his framework of cultural 
contestation. 
Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
Cultural contestation, according to Ross (2009), can be understood as the “inclusion and 
exclusion from a society’s symbolic landscape and that such inclusion or exclusion tells us 
about the politics of acceptance, rejection and access to a society’s resources and 
opportunities” (2009: 1). Ethnic and cultural groups seek to express their cultural identity in 
their symbolic landscape which comprises sacred sites and physical objects as well as music, 
language or public celebrations. Ross argues that since scholarship often solely focuses on 
competing interests, incompatible identities are overlooked. For this reason, he calls for 
examining symbolic landscapes and how they demonstrate the (perhaps missing) recognition 
of groups, how different groups refer to each other and themselves in psychocultural 
narratives as well as how the control of the symbolic landscape is related to resource 
allocation (Ross 2009: 1-2, see also Ross 2007).  
As domestic heritage politics and the inherent allocation of resources among state and non-
state actors are strongly influenced by inscriptions of local tangible or intangible culture on 
the national level or at the UNESCO, it is necessary to incorporate a multi-level governance 
                                                          
2 See also Louisa Schein (2000) on eroticization of ethnic minorities in China. 
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perspective into the analysis. Taking a multi-level governance perspective facilitates an 
analysis of how different government levels interact. It therefore helps to explain “the 
dispersion of central government authority both vertically to actors located at other territorial 
levels, and horizontally to non-state actors” (Bach and Flinders 2004: 4). This fragmentation 
of authority between the central and subnational government levels, on the one hand, and 
between horizontal units and actors on the other, is moreover a key feature of the Chinese 
political system, commonly referred to as “fragmented authoritarianism” (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2009). In this framework, decentralization processes are said to 
have resulted in a fragmentation between the lines of command, which provides subnational 
governments with greater leeway in policy implementation. Yet this greater leeway also 
results in competition between governmental units across the vertical and horizontal lines of 
authority, which leads to diverging policy implementation across government levels and 
geographical regions (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 21). 
The fact that fragmentation between different government levels leads to competition, is 
important for understanding cultural contestation between the state and ethnic groups as it 
enables to acknowledge the plurality of official and vernacular narratives that have an impact 
on acts of cultural contestation. Moreover, cultural identities and expressions are linked to 
different scales, be it the local, regional or national. While building on Ross’ work, this 
chapter thus seeks to extend his framework by acknowledging that the processes he 
described unfold on multiple levels and scales.  
The PR China is as a significant case study to understand cultural contestation processes 
across levels or scales. Firstly, as mentioned above, the China exemplifies the ruptured and 
uneven developments in many state-nations across the Global South. Secondly, the Chinese 
party-state is a key actor in global heritage governance, particularly when examining its 
inscriptions on UNESCO heritage lists. To date, it has the second largest number of sites on 
the World Heritage List worldwide (52) (UNESCO 2017a), and the largest number of ICH 
practices on the UNESCO ICH Representative List (39) (UNESCO 2017b.). Finally, due to its 
rich ethnic diversity, the Chinese province of Yunnan is a critical case to understand how 
ethnic minorities contest cultural identities superscribed by different actors within the multi-
level state. 
The findings of this chapter are based on a case study of Yunnan province in which Lancang 
County, takes the center stage. Yet, local cultural contestation processes will be examined 
with reference to decisions made at the national, provincial and municipal (or prefectural) 
level. I collected data for this study by conducting several months of field work and engaging 
local officials, academics and cultural practitioners in semi-structured interviews. Moreover, a 
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plurality of primary (laws, policies, government plans) and secondary sources (newspaper 
articles, academic studies) in Mandarin Chinese and English inform the study. 
Governmental Programs as an Opportunity for Fostering Cultural Identity 
Following the ratification of the UNESCO ICH Convention in 2004, the Chinese party-state, 
through the Ministry of Culture’s ICH Department, implemented the Convention by creating 
ICH lists and an ICH inheritors program (SC 2005), the Chinese equivalent to a Living 
Human Treasures program (UNESCO 2002) in 2005. While ICH practices are inscribed on 
lists to raise awareness, the ICH inheritors program seeks to promote the transmission of 
ICH practices within local communities by financially supporting selected cultural 
practitioners (SC 2005, MC 2006). Government units at all administrative levels with 
decision-making powers (the national, provincial, municipal and county level) were asked to 
create their own ICH lists and ICH inheritor programs, resulting in a multi-level system of ICH 
safeguarding. After the county-level selects ICH practices and cultural practitioners from 
lower levels (village or township) for inclusion on its list, the municipal level creates its own 
ICH and ICH inheritor lists based on county-level programs. Thereby ICH practices and 
inheritors can be promoted “up the ladder” to eventually become national representatives of 
Chinese ICH (Maags 2018 forthcoming, see also Bodolec 2012: 259). 
As the inscription of ICH items (and in part ICH inheritors) on lists at the next governmental 
(e.g. municipal level) level generates political and economic benefits for government officials 
on that level (county level), local governments compete to promote their selected cultural 
practice “up the ladder” (Maags 2018 forthcoming). Firstly, this competition is due to the 
establishment of such lists and programs on each administrative level. Secondly, as outlined 
above, the fragmentation of authority between different government units along the horizontal 
and vertical line fosters competition, as local governments attempt to obtain a promotion or 
win superordinate level funding (Zhong 2003: 87; Heberer and Trappel 2013: 1056) for local 
ICH safeguarding projects. As described elsewhere in greater detail (Maags 2018 
forthcoming) the multi-level policy implementation and the fragmented authority structure 
have resulted in cultural contestation between local communities who all seek to be selected 
to represent a local ICH, which is prevalent in many localities albeit in different variations, at 
the next level. As a result, on the one hand, the promotion of ICH practices and inheritors “up 
the ladder” creates contestation and conflict between local communities (Maags 2018 
forthcoming).   
Yet, on the other hand, the superordinate government levels select from these local ICH 
practices to forge a regional, provincial or national cultural identity that is to promote social 
cohesion and pride. Fostering a national identity is especially of importance as China is 
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home to 56 officially recognized ethnic minorities - a classification which was devised in the 
Ethnic Identification Project3 from 1950s to the 1980s (Wang 2015: 4). To increase social 
cohesion, the party-state has increasingly selected ICH practices of ethnic minorities to 
UNESCO representative lists4, as it seeks to promote the narrative of a “unified multi-ethnic 
state”, and thereby an inclusive multi-ethnic national identity. In this narrative the party-state 
emphasizes a supposed historical unity of different ethnic groups to display the uniting of 
different ethnic groups as natural and inevitable (Bird 2017: 3). Inscriptions of ethnic 
minorities’ cultural sites and practices on UNESCO lists, further substantiate this narrative 
and, according to Shepherd (2009) enhances Chinese political claim over these territories. 
In the case of Yunnan province, the promotion of the narrative of a “unified multi-ethnic state” 
is particularly important as it is home to the largest diversity of ethnic groups in the country, 
being inhabited by 26 ethnic groups (Yunnan gov. 2015). Yunnan’s official documents 
therefore foster a similar narrative. In Art. 1 of Yunnan’s ICH policy of 2005, for instance, the 
prime objective of safeguarding ICH is allegedly to promote “patriotism”, “strengthen 
Yunnan’s economic and social development” and “preserve national unity” (Art. 1; YNCD 
2005). While maintaining social cohesion is a main objective, the provinces’ strong economic 
reliance on the tourism industry is another. As the tourism industry, in addition to agriculture 
and mining, are the provincial pillar industries (Britannica 2016), the safeguarding of ethnic 
minority culture is tantamount to preserving a key resource needed for economic 
development. Yunnan thus implements central policies in which “Heritage construction is a 
core feature of regional development strategies, especially in the historically poor and 
ethnically diverse regions of the southwest” (Evans and Rowlands 2015: 272). 
To promote social cohesion and economic development Yunnan province is very eager to 
develop its provincial ICH safeguarding. For instance, already in the late 1990s Yunnan 
established policies for the safeguarding of traditional cultural practices (Liang 2013: 61-62). 
In addition, it has successfully inscribed 105 ICH practices on national ICH lists (Xinhua 2017) 
and established 66 ICH environmental protection zones in Yunnan, which are inhabited by 
21 different ethnic groups (YCB 2014). Yunnan’s eagerness to inscribe ICH practices and 
zones has at times caused conflict between ethnic groups. To reduce potential cultural 
contestation and conflicts around the designation of ICH items and safeguarding areas 
among ethnic groups, who all seek to have their ICH practice listed at the national level and 
thus enjoy national recognition, the provincial government attempts to recommend equal 
numbers of ICH practices from each ethnic minority to the national level. However, ethnic 
                                                          
3 In this “Project” ethnic groups who identified as a separate ethnicity were asked to officially register as an ethnic 
minority. Yet, ethnic groups who failed to apply for recognition did not obtain ethnic minority status and thus do 
not enjoy minority rights (Wang 2015: 4).  
4 Among the first 10 ICH items the Chinese party-state nominated for the UNESCO ICH list five are representing 
ethnic minority culture (UNESCO 2017c). 
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sub-groups, who do not identify with the culture of the larger ethnic group, do not feel 
represented (Blumenfield 2018 forthcoming). As one prominent ICH expert noted, the 
designation of a territory as “Cultural Landscape of the Honghe Hani Rice Terraces” in 2013 
at UNESCO similarly caused contestation between ethnic groups, as the region is not only 
inhabited by the Hani ethnic group (Interview 7; see also UNESCO 2013). The designation of 
ICH practices and zones has thus led to the glossing over of ethnic differences which have 
created tensions between ethnic groups, who contest state programs and inscriptions which 
violate their cultural identity.   
As Yunnan is one of the poorest provinces in PR China5 (Finance Sina 2017), it is eager to 
make use of the national financial incentive structure to fund its promotion of ICH 
safeguarding. The central government rewards local policy innovation by declaring local best 
practices as “models” for national emulation and providing these models with additional 
central funding (Zhong 2003; Heilmann 2008). Yunnan is eager to use its leeway in policy 
formulation and implementation to be successful in the national competition for central level 
funding. As it is home to many ethnic minorities which are often allowed more extensive 
leeway in policy formulation and implementation due to their “self-governing” status6, sub-
provincial governments can potentially use their greater leeway for policy innovation to 
compete for national-level funding. One example of such a model unit is Lancang County (in 
Pu’er municipality) in the very south of Yunnan province.   
Lancang County (Lancang Lahuzu Zizhi Xian) is a poor, “self-governing” jurisdiction in the 
south of Yunnan bordering Myanmar. The County is home to eight different ethnic groups of 
which the largest group are the Lahu. To promote local Lahu culture, the county government 
began to develop its safeguarding measures from an early stage on. Following the ratification 
of the UNESCO ICH Convention in 2003, the County launched its “Lancang Properous 
County” initiative which is aimed at promoting traditional Lahu culture in the domestic and 
international realm (Xinhua 2014). This initiative was followed by a series of county-level 
policies 7 with similar aims in 2008 (revised in 2012) (LCCC 2015a). In these and other 
policies, the Lancang government stipulates that each village in its jurisdiction must establish 
a cultural performance troupe and a cultural center where local residents can receive lessons 
in ICH practices and use musical instruments free of charge. Moreover, ICH practices and 
inheritors are to be promoted for the inscription in local and superordinate ICH lists (Interview 
42). The County has been very successful. Two of their ICH practices, the Mupamipa legend 
                                                          
5 Yunnan’s provincial GDP ranks 23rd out of the 31 provinces and autonomous regions (Finance Sina 2017). 
6 The PRC’s Constitution (2004) stipulates that ethnic minorities have the right to pass local regulations, manage 
their own budget (to be approved by central authorities) and government departments need to be headed by 
members of the ethnic groups (Art. 112-122) (NPC 2004). 
7 These policies include “Traditional Ethnic Folk Culture Protection Regulations” (revised in 2012) as well as the 
“Lancang Lahu Minority Self-governing County Methods on Strengthening the Implementation of County level ICH 
Protection and Transmission” (LCCC 2015a). 
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and the Lusheng dance were inscribed on national ICH list in 2006 (China.com 2007a, 
2007b). Moreover, due to their safeguarding efforts, Lancang was identified as “model county” 
for ICH safeguarding by the central government. These rewards have also contributed to 
local pride, as an interview with one county ICH official indicates: 
This is not meant to sing one’s own praise, [but] Lancang is used as a model [lit. 
“typical example”]. In the whole province, our transmission of ICH items, our work 
achievements and the atmosphere of our culture are [considered to be] all very good. 
(Interview 42). 
As a result of being named a model county, Lancang is able to benefit from the national 
financial incentive structure.  
Along with the promotion of Lahu culture, the county government is disseminating a narrative 
around Lancang County being a “Global Lahu Cultural Centre”. A central theme of their 
narrative is the Mupamipa (Creating Heaven, Creating Earth) legend which tells the story of 
the origin of the Lahu ethnic group and speaks about their society, religion and culture as 
well as their journey to the southwest of Yunnan. In this narrative, Lancang is portrayed at 
being the center of Lahu culture. This narrative and the Mupamipa legend has been 
tangiblized through the creation of a symbolic cultural landscape. As, according to legend, 
the Lahu were born out of a calabash (Interview 42), in recent years, images from the legend, 
especially the calabash, have been placed across the city (see Illustration 1). For instance, a 
new square has been built in the midst of the city, in which a large calabash decorates the 
center. According to a local cultural official, the square is to provide public space to perform 
Lahu cultural practices (Interview 42).  






Moreover, a new park has been created which is filled with statues representing events 
within the Mupamipa legend as well as displaying the Lahu or other ethnic minorities of the 
region (see Illustration 2).  
 
 






Again, the park incorporates small stages where traditional dances and musical 
performances can be displayed. The city environment has thus been recreated into a 
symbolic cultural landscape demonstrating Lahu culture. According to the county government, 
its main objective behind the rebranding and promotion of ICH practices has been the 
preservation of Lahu ethnic culture. As a third of the Lahu ethnic minority worldwide8 live in 
the county, the county government – whose staff are themselves Lahu - sees itself as the 
wardens of traditional Lahu culture. They therefore promote traditional dances, songs and 
legends lie at the core of Lahu culture (Interview 42).  
The Mupamipa legend furthermore since the 1950s has been interpreted along the lines of 
official narratives, using it as evidence of a supposed origin of the Lahu in the north-western 
Qinghai Plain in an attempt to integrate the Lahu into the history of the Chinese state (Ma 
2009: 111-114). Although this supposed origin, which scholars such as Ma (2009) contest, is 
not contested by the Lahu themselves, the Mupamipa legend provides a “politically safe” 
opportunity to create a narrative and symbolic cultural landscape which highlights and 
celebrates the distinctiveness of Lahu culture vis-à-vis the dominant Han culture. This 
celebration of distinctiveness in opposition to the Han majority, historically and at present, 
furthermore forms the basis of Lahu cultural identity. Ma (2013), for instance, argues that  
The Lahu identity and Lahu culture have been mobilized under the conditions of the 
arrival of the state powers in the mountains. Without the state’s penetration there 
                                                          
8 The other two thirds of the Lahu lives in other parts of China or in neighbouring regions in Myanmar 
and Thailand, see Ma 2013: 8-9. 
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would have been no political-religion system or Lahu identity, based on detailed 
historical research on this frontier (Ma 2013: 9). 
The promotion of the legend can thus support Lahu cultural identity as well as the 
safeguarding of local ICH practices.  
Overall, Lancang’s county government has thus seized the opportunity of the Chinese 
leadership’s greater attention to traditional culture to celebrate its cultural identity and 
popularize Lahu culture more broadly. While the safeguarding measures foster the 
preservation of Lahu culture and identity in a rapidly changing environment, the national ICH 
lists demonstrate national social recognition of Lahu culture which enhances local pride in 
traditional ethnic culture. As one ICH inheritor proudly explained:  
at the moment we have [performed] in Shanghai, Beijing [and these cities]. They have 
all [experienced] our Lahu singing, our Lahu minority dance, so they know a little, 
have seen a little (Interview 45). 
The county government has thus been successful in promoting Lahu traditional culture 
beyond Yunnan, which has fostered local cultural identity and pride. Moreover, national 
recognition also equals financial support, which is needed to fund the safeguarding 
measures. Ultimately, national recognition and local safeguarding measures further 
emphasize the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Lahu culture vis-à-vis the Han as well as 
other ethnic minorities in the region. 
Multi-level Threats to Local Cultural Narratives and Identities 
Although the nationwide recognition and promotion of Lahu ethnic minority culture can be 
regarded as a success, as Lancang is now able to showcase their culture and distinctiveness 
domestically and internationally, their success does not protect them from interests, 
strategies and cultural identities promoted at other government levels. In Pu’er, the 
municipality to which Lancang county belongs, for instance, a different narrative has 
dominated. In Pu’er municipality as a whole the Deang, Bulang, Hani and Wa ethnic groups 
are most numerous (Pu’er gov. 2015; Ethnic China 2016). The regions closer to the 
municipality’s capital, have moreover historically been part of an ancient “Tea Horse Road” in 
China, which linked the tea production in the area to consumers in other parts of China. After 
Pu’er tea re-gained popularity in the early 2000s (Zhang 2014: 8), the provincial government 
in Kunming decided to rebrand the municipality along tea culture and production. As a part of 
this strategy, the municipality which had formerly been known as Simao was renamed into 
Pu’er (the name of the tea) in 2008 (Zhang 2014: 82). Rebranding the municipality’s capital 
along tea culture, furthermore included the nomination of its tea mountains as “Ancient Tea 
Plantations of Jingmai Mountain in Pu'er” for inscription on the World Heritage List. To date, 
however, the nomination awaits approval (UNESCO 2016). As a result of the rebranding, the 
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Pu’er tea industry has boomed, sparking a subsequent boom in the tourism and cultural 
industries (PETA 2016). 
Thus, in Pu’er a different narrative and symbolic cultural landscape as taken shape. While it 
celebrates its rich ethnic diversity, it’s regional identity is strongly focused on tea culture, 
which is only part of some ethnic minority cultures but not all (Interview 43). Field visits 
showed that in comparison to Lancang, Pu’er’s symbolic cultural landscape is not as much 
shaped by the display of certain objects such as the calabash, but strongly visible in the 
transformation of its cultural space. Across the city, tea houses have opened, which 
celebrate the drinking of tea through tea ceremonies. Pu’er tea and local ethnic minority 
culture are common sights on billboards and tourism advertisement. Overall, local residents 
appear to have “rediscovered” Pu’er tea and related cultural practices and rituals. 
While Pu’er is said to have started to promote its local tea already since the mid-1990s 
(Zhang 2014: 42), the provincial government has had a strong influence on the acceleration 
and expansion of Pu’er’s urban rebranding. Already in the mid-2000s, the provincial 
government issued policies focusing on enhancing the development if the provincial tea 
industry (Yunnan gov. 2005). Soon after Kunming commenced to invest into the Pu’er tea 
industry by founding state-owned tea enterprises. In subsequent years it developed a brand 
and marketing strategy for Pu’er tea which was promoted during the 2008 Olympics as well 
as the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. For the Pu’er municipal government this development 
has been highly advantageous as it strongly seeks to foster its economic development by 
enhancing its tea, tourism and cultural industries (PECB 2012). 
However, while the promotion of Pu’er as a tea culture destination has been to the benefit of 
the municipality, it does not necessarily support Lancang County’s interests and cultural 
identity. In 2012, for instance, the provincial government declared that it would establish a 
historical cultural tourism zone displaying the origin of tea. According to this plan, three 
adjoining counties within Pu’er municipality, including Lancang, are to be promoted as a “Tea 
Origin Culture Park” in order to transform the region into one of Yunnan’s ten largest 
historical cultural tourism zones. In fact, Lancang would be situated at the core of this park 
which offers tourists the experience of tea culture, entertainment, shops, hotels and ethnic 
minority culture. At the time of writing, the provincial government was seeking investors 
(Yunnan gov. 2015b), who in addition to county governments such as Lancang (LTCA 2016) 
are to fund the establishment of the park.  
For Lancang County and its government’s dream of becoming a “Global Lahu Cultural 
Centre” the provincial government’s plans create a dilemma. On the one hand, the County is 
extremely poor (in Yunnan and in national terms) and women have been marrying Han to 
move out of the region (Ma 2013: 3-12). It could therefore benefit from the economic and 
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infrastructure development which a new tourism zone would facilitate. As noted above, 
Lancang County is focusing on safeguarding and promoting its performing arts, such as 
traditional Lahu dances, songs and myths. An integration into a tourism zone could provide 
these traditional artists and amateurs with the opportunity to present their art as well as 
generate an income, thus enabling a sustainable safeguarding of these ICH practices.  
On the other hand, Pu’er municipality’s cultural identity and narratives directly run counter to 
Lancang County’s plans of establishing themselves as a Global Lahu Cultural Center. As a 
local ICH official argued, although Lahu culture has incorporated some elements of other 
ethnic minorities, tea culture is not part of Lahu culture but rather related to the Bulang ethnic 
minority (Interview 43). One ICH official for instance argued that  
Our (genesis) legend has always continued to develop, we sing it every day and 
every night. The songs and dances have special characteristics. Speaking of other 
ethnic minorities, for instance, the Bulang ethnic minority, they like tea, this minorities’ 
ICH projects evolve around tea culture. They have a totally different focus than we do 
(Interview 42). 
By being incorporated into a larger tourism zone which is linked to a different cultural identity 
and narrative, Lancang would thus face the challenge of being subsumed under a larger, 
regional identity which was constructed by superordinate government levels in an attempt to 
promote economic development. While the project is still in the making, Lancang appears to 
react to these 2012 plans by more strongly promoting its county as a “Global Lahu Cultural 
Centre”. It for instance has adopted new local policies (LCCC 2015a), is popularizing its 
culture in TV shows and movies, and is winning national rewards, for instance, “China Village 
of Folk Culture Art” and “China Cultural Advanced County” (LCCC 2016, People’s Daily 2016, 
Yunnan Network 2016). It thereby attempts to strengthen its cultural identity and symbolic 
cultural landscape at a time when competing cultural identities are promoted which might 
undermine Lahu cultural identity. In doing so, it produces counter-narratives which tell a 
different story of the locality, running against the broader, regional narratives. In contrast to 
engaging in open contestation of superordinate plans, Lancang has thus chosen to not 
directly oppose state-sanctioned narratives and plans, but to subvert them indirectly by 
maintaining and promoting its own, alternative narratives.  
Ambiguous Effects of China’s Multi-level ICH Safeguarding System 
Whereas the introduction of an ICH safeguarding system in China has provided ethnic 
groups such as the Lahu with the opportunity to enhance safeguarding and promotion of their 
ICH practices and thereby to strengthen their cultural identity, the simultaneous safeguarding 
and promotion efforts on other governmental levels may contradict or undermine local efforts 
in case they are not in line with superordinate narratives. On the one hand, the Lahu’s 
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cultural identity has been reinforced by the national recognition and popularization of its 
cultural practices such as the Lusheng dance and the Mupamipa legend. As this national 
recognition goes hand in hand with financial support and several awards, as for instance to 
be named a “model county”, and somewhat with a gain in political and economic power. On 
the other hand, despite its recognition and greater power, it remains to be a poor county 
which needs to oblige with superordinate development plans, even when they run counter its 
own plans and narratives. Here Lancang County appears to face a dilemma between 
embracing the development plans it so desperately needs to provide its residents with 
employment and growth prospects, while fearing that these development plans and related 
narratives will undermine its own narratives and by extension cultural identity.   
Lancang County’s response to this dilemma appears to have been to not openly contest any 
plans or narratives developed by superordinate levels, although the County government 
might lobby for incorporation or acknowledgement of its own plans and narratives behind 
closed doors. It rather appears to strengthen its own narratives and cultural identity by further 
developing their own ICH safeguarding measures and symbolic cultural landscape, e.g. by 
creating a large square displaying Mupamipa symbols such as the calabash. In doing so, its 
symbolic cultural landscape and narratives are reinforced and demonstrate a 
counternarrative vis-à-vis other, regional narratives which might undermine its cultural 
identity.  
Although local communities across China have also openly contested state narratives and 
development projects (see e.g. Svensson 2006; Kang 2009: 240), a more indirect or covert 
form of cultural contestation appears to be a common strategy among local ethnic groups, 
and by extension any cultural group, who do not have the power or agency to openly defy 
and contest superordinate narratives and plans. Yu (2015) for instance, has similarly argued 
that local Miao communities create and disseminate counter-narratives as well as secretly 
and publicly perform their rituals which go against official interpretations so that “Vernacular 
narratives, beliefs, spaces and practices have spread beyond the reach of the state, even as 
the country undergoes massive economic and social transformation, and the more recent 
global surge of interest in safeguarding ICH” (2015: 1032). Similarly, Evans and Rowlands 
(2015) have pointed out that the sustainability of local initiatives “depends on the successful 
accommodation of the state’s political, economic and commercial interests through 
appropriating and contesting the commodification of heritage and negotiating complex 
relationships between individuals, communities, entrepreneurs and official agencies (2015: 
280, emphasis in original). Cultural contestation in authoritarian China can therefore take 
more indirect forms in which government plans and narratives are not openly contested, 
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even accommodated to a certain extent, while subtle counternarratives and measures 
simultaneously undermine superordinate efforts.  
However, many of the studies which elaborate on these indirect forms of cultural contestation 
portray a dichotomy between local communities and the state in which local communities are 
fighting against state control and repression. Although this picture accurately depicts many 
instances of cultural contestation, it is necessary to consider the different actors and 
administrative levels within multi-level governance systems such as that of the PRC. 
Different government levels may pursue different interests and strategies as well as 
disseminate different narratives. As Yu (2015) has argued, in China central government 
policy is often contested by local governments, as expressed in the local idiom “Up, there is 
policy. Bottom, there is countermeasure’ (shang you zheng ce, xia you dui ce)” (2015: 1022). 
Cultural contestation therefore may arise due to a locality being caught up in a multilevel 
governance structure which all have different interests, strategies as well as narratives and 
identities. Moreover, the dichotomy between state and society glosses over the fact that 
government officials are also part of the local community and, especially when their own local 
cultural identity is concerned, may attempt to use opportunities provided by the state such as 
ICH lists and financial incentive structures to safeguard their local heritage and create a 
symbolic cultural landscape which reinforces their cultural identity.  
In the case of Lancang County it appears that the local officials have used their available 
resources and power to safeguard Lahu ICH practices by promoting local ICH practices “up 
the ladder” of the multi-level ICH inscription system or by establishing culture centers and 
troupes. In doing so, they reinforce local cultural and historical narratives and cultural identity, 
while simultaneously complying with central policies calling for the establishment of local ICH 
safeguarding measures and using heritage as a development strategy for poor, ethnically 
diverse regions.  
Conclusion 
The introduction of an ICH safeguarding system in the Chinese multj-ethnic, multi-level state 
has had ambiguous effects. While the party-state’s recent increase in attention towards 
safeguarding of ICH practices has been, among others, an effort to strengthen nation-
building and nationalist sentiments among its populace, governmental programs also 
generate cultural conflicts among ethnic and cultural groups as well as between these groups 
and the state. While many conflicts arise due to the artificial classification of ethnic groups 
during the 1950s and the central strategy of using ethnicity as a resource to develop poor 
and remote regions on Chinese periphery, this chapter has shown that the multiple 
government levels and scales at which identities are formed similarly create cultural 
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contestations. While some local communities and groups chose to openly challenge imposed 
or competing narratives and cultural identities, others select more indirect and subtle ways of 
contestation which are based on creating counter-narratives and reinforcing their local 
cultural identity through developing a symbolic cultural landscape. Moreover, the dichotomy 
between “state” and “society” is not always as clear cut as state officials may be members of 
an ethnic minority and thus have an intrinsic motivation to use opportunities that the state 
provides to safeguard and promote their ethnic cultural identity. Since the People’s Republic 
is an authoritarian state, however, cultural contestation may take more subtle and indirect 
forms of cultural contestation which are based on counter-narratives and identities. 
The Chinese party-state can be understood through the notion of the “robustly multinational” 
state-nation (Stepan et al. 2010). On the one hand, the party-state has engendered “strong 
identification and loyalty from their citizens” (Stepan et al. 2010: 1) by promoting a national 
identity through the narrative of a multi-ethnic state (Brady 2012: 3) and fostering a 
“performance-based legitimacy” (Holbig and Gilley 2010) which promises economic growth 
and future prosperity. On the other hand, the national narrative of a multi-ethnic state 
continues to be contested by certain groups, for instance, among the Tibetans and Uyghurs 
(Bhattacharya 2008), who “in the name of nationalism and self-determination, advance 
claims of independence” (Stepan et al. 2010: 1). However, although Stepan et al.’s (2010) 
conception of a state-nation is based on democratic systems, many of which are federalist in 
nature (Stepan et al. 2010: 22) and the Chinese party-state is an authoritarian, centralized 
state, this chapter demonstrates that China displays similarities with other state nations in the 
Global South. Firstly, due to its fragmentation, subnational administrative levels, especially 
provinces, obtain greater leeway in policy formulation, thereby enabling similar dynamics as 
in federalist states. Secondly, there are separatist movements among ethnic minority groups 
and at times open forms of cultural contestation against imposed narratives and identities by 
the party-state. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the state it also gives way to 
more indirect and subtle forms of contestation which simultaneously seek to accommodate 
and contest state competing state narratives and identities.  
To understand the complexities of cultural contestation, particularly in multi-ethnic states, 
more research needs to be conducted which incorporate alternative explanatory frameworks 
such as that proposed by Ross (2007) which highlight the role of cultural identity and 
narratives in these processes. This chapter has sought to build on Ross’ framework and to 
extend it by incorporating a multi-level perspective. While this chapter has briefly related its 
findings to the literature of state-nations, more research is needed to demonstrate how 
cultural contestation emerges and unfolds in different types of state-nations and nation-states, 
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in order to comprehend how the differences in ethnic composition, cultural homogeneity and 
political systems have an impact on cultural contestation and with what effects.  
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